Warrant canary

Status

No signed statement yet. Statements are signed with an offline PGP key kept out of the infrastructure; the key ceremony — generation, offline custody and publication of the public key — has not been completed. Until it is, this page claims nothing: the fields below are empty by design, not by omission.

Signing key fingerprint

— pending the ceremony (D-02)

Last signed statement

— none yet

Next statement due

— starts after the ceremony (monthly cadence)

The statement slot

Each signed statement will be published here as plain text, with a detached PGP signature over exactly those bytes. The most recent statement always appears in this slot; earlier ones remain reachable beside it.

What each statement covers

The same categories as the standing counters on /transparency — restated as an attestation with a date and a signature:

• Government / law-enforcement content requests received
• Preservation orders received
• Takedown / content-removal demands honoured
• Account-termination demands (no accounts exist)
• Warrant canaries / gag orders restricting disclosure
• National-security letters / orders
• Third-party (non-government) data requests
• Any change to the data inventory or page-triggering list on /transparency

Cadence: one statement per month. The point of a fixed cadence: omission of a scheduled statement is itself the signal — silence is not allowed to look like safety.

How to verify

• When the ceremony completes, the public key is published here (fingerprint above) — compare it out-of-band if you can.
• Download the statement text exactly as served, and verify the detached signature with any OpenPGP implementation — the signature validates those exact bytes and nothing else.
• A published-but-unverifiable canary is worthless; if the key or a signature ever fails, treat it as a signal and say so.